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destroys the plant and emits masses of radioactive material into the 
atmosphere. 
5,000 die." 
The populations of neighboring communities are decimated; 
Subject 19: "A core meltdown occurs in the reactor of a nuclear 
power plant located a·.few miles from a �ajar city. The backup systems 
fail and a lot of deadly radiation escapes. The winds blow it toward 
the metropolitan area which has a population of 2 million. The nuclear 
fallout kills 200,000 people within a 35-mile radius of the plant." 
The distributions of fatalities associated with the:-v.ar,ious scenarios 
are shown in Table�- The most common scenarios for commercial aviation 
were based on crashes between two jumbo jets (usually Boeing 747's)_. The 
two extreme aviation disasters in Table 4 involved.:crashes into heavily 
populated areas. Overall, these estimates of our subjects are not much 
higher than those made by experts. The Reactor Safety Study (U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975) reports data suggesting that the 
probability of an aviation accident involving 1,000 deaths (our subjects' 
median estimate) occurring at least once during a 60-year lifetime is 
about .02 or .03. Thus, such a response is not unreasonable in light of 
our instructions to describe "the biggest disaster you seriously think 
might occur during your lifetime." Only three of our 29 subjects 
estimated aviation fatalities beyond the range considered as at least 
remotely possible by experts. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
would not be considered reasonable by most technical experts. These 
estimates tended to be several orders of magnitude greater than those pro­
vided in the Reactor Safety Study (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). 
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Instead, risk assessments must be derived from complex mathematical 
models and structures such as the fault trees and event trees used in the 
Reactor Safety Study to estimate the probability of a loss-of-coolant 
accident (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975). Despite an appearance 
of objectivity, such assessments are inherently subjective. Someone, 
relying on judgment, must determine the structure of the analysis, inclu­
ding the ways that failure might occur, their relative importance, and 
their logical interconnections. 
The difficulties of applying fault-tree and event-tree analysis have 
led many critics to question the validity of these methods (e.g., Bryan, 
1974; Fischhoff, 1977; Primack, 1975). One major concern is that impor­
tant initiating events or pathways to failure may be omitted, causing 
risks to be underestimated. Another problem is the difficulty of taking 
proper account of "common-mode failures." To insure greater safety, 
many technological systems are built with a great deal of redundancy. 
Should one crucial part fail, there are others designed either to do the 
same job or to limit the resulting damage. Since the probability of each 
individual part failing is very small, the probability of all failing, 
thereby creating a major disaster, should be extremely small. This 
reasoning is valid only if the various:, components are independent--that 
is, if what causes one part to fail will not automatically cause the others 
to fail. "Common mode failure" occurs when the independence assumption 
does not hold. As an example, the discovery that a set of pipes in several 
nuclear plants were all made from the same batch of defective steel 
-
_(Eugene Register Guard, Oct. 13, 1974), ::(;ugg;s�s ___ tha-t: th�_simultaneous_
failure�of several such pipes was not inconceivable. Tl
i
e same.fire that 





















